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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the link between the shadow economy and financial sector development in Malaysia for the period 1971-2013. We calculate the 
size of the shadow economy by using the modified-cash-deposits-ratio approach recently developed by Pickhardt and Sardia (2011). We investigate 
the contention made by Blackburn et al. (2012) that financial sector development can mitigate shadow economy – higher level of financial sector 
development lead to lower level of shadow economy. Our results show that there is a non-linear long-run relationship between shadow economy 
and financial sector development in Malaysia, an inverted-U shape curve, suggesting that at lower (higher) level of financial sector development 
commensurate with higher (lower) level of the shadow economy. One policy implication from this study is that the financial sector can play an important 
role in reducing shadow economy by improving the accessibility to financing and to the credit market.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The presence of shadow economy in any nation is a fact of life 
(Schneider and Enste, 2000). Shadow economy is also related 
to criminal activities (Naylor, 1996; Habibullah and Eng, 2006). 
Shadow economy reduces the tax base and eventually reduces 
overall tax revenue and consequently may cripple an economy 
(Eilat and Zinnes, 2002). Furthermore, since the activity of the 
shadow economy is excluded from the official gross domestic 
product (GDP) statistics, thus, official GDP statistics will provide 
wrong indicators for macroeconomic policy decisions. Other than 
that, the existence of shadow economy creates opportunity for 
distortions in resource allocation especially in the labor market, 
whereby firms participate in underground activities are not 
subject to labor regulations and workers working underground 
are subjected to unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, very 
low wages and with no job security net (Eilat and Zinnes, 2002). 
Thus, fighting shadow economy should be an important agenda 
for any government.
However, estimating the size of the shadow economy is not an easy 
task as these players avoid detection and furthermore, authorities 
lacking the resources to monitor their activities (Singh et al., 2012). 
In the case of Malaysia, Kasipillai et al. (2000) have estimated the 
size of the Malaysian shadow economy for the period 1971-1994 
using the standard currency demand approach; ranging from 8.1% 
to gross national product in 1971 to 3.73% in 1994. On the other 
hand, international studies by Schneider et al. (2010), Elgin and 
Oztunali (2012) and Alm and Embaye (2013) have also estimated 
the size of the shadow economy for Malaysia in a multi-country 
panel data framework. Schneider et al. (2010) estimated the size 
of the shadow economy for 162 countries including Malaysia for 
eight time periods that is 1999-2007. For the eight time periods, 
Malaysia’s shadow economy averages 31% of the official GDP. 
Elgin and Oztunali (2012) estimated the magnitude of the shadow 
economy involving 161 countries over the period 1955-2008; with 
Malaysia’s shadow economy averages 47%. On the other hand, 
Alm and Embaye (2013) estimated the size of the shadow economy 
for 111 countries for the period 1984-2006 and the estimated size 
for Malaysia’s shadow economy averages 30% for the period.
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The present paper estimates the size of the shadow economy in 
Malaysia for the period 1971-2013 by employing the modified-
cash-deposit-ratio (MCDR) procedure recently proposed by 
Pickhardt and Sarda (2011; 2013); and further to investigates 
the factors affecting the Malaysian shadow economy during that 
period. In this study, our focus is on the role of financial sector 
development as a vehicle to reduce shadow economy in Malaysia. 
Our study concludes that financial sector development can play an 
important role in mitigating shadow economy in Malaysia. The 
paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review some 
of the related literature on factors affecting shadow economy. In 
Section 3, we discuss the model and method used to estimates 
the determinants of shadow economy in Malaysia. In Section 4, 
we discuss the empirical results. The last section contains our 
conclusion.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The drivers that cause people or firm participating in the shadow 
economy are numerous. Economists recognized that tax burden 
either direct or indirect taxation, social security contribution, 
regulation, tax morale, unemployment rate, GDP per capita 
(Schneider, 2005; Dell’Anno and Solomon, 2008; Bajada and 
Schneider, 2005); government spending or consumption (Vo and 
Ly, 2014; Wang et al., 2006; Buehn and Schneider, 2012); weak 
government and bad governance (Friedman et al., 2000; Manolas 
et al., 2013); lack of trust for the government (D’Hernoncourt 
and Meon, 2012); crime rate (Wang et al., 2006); and inflation 
(Bittencourt et al., 2014); are all contribute in increasing the size 
of the shadow economy.
Another strand of studies investigates how access to the financial 
or credit market could mitigate shadow economy. Numerous 
studies linking shadow economy and financial markets suggest 
that although formality imposes fiscal burden on a firm, such as 
taxes or costs of complying with regulatory requirements in the 
form of registration and license fee to be able to operate formally; 
benefits of being formal consist in the access to public goods and 
services. Straub (2005) posits that by assessing public goods, firms 
are protected by the police and the judicial system against crime so 
that output will not be disrupted and productivity can be enhanced 
with the use of public infrastructures. Furthermore, exchange of 
goods and services will be more efficient in the formal markets 
as enforcement of property rights and contracts are ensured and 
secured. In fact Singh et al. (2012) have stressed that firm operating 
in the shadow economy faced a variety of constraints that make 
it difficult for them to do business and grow. For them to expand 
and increase their productivity firm needs to have access to public 
infrastructures, electricity, land and water, institutions, access 
to new technology, access to external finance and other benefits 
associated with participation in the formal economy. Straub (2005) 
emphasize the role of the financial market in reducing the shadow 
economy. Straub (2005. p. 299) argues that “complying with costly 
registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public 
goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts that make the 
participation in the formal credit market possible.” Antunes and 
Calvacanti (2007) contend that the benefit from formalization is 
better access to outside finance; and Quintin (2008) stresses that 
the size of the informal sector decreases as the degree to which 
financing contracts can be enforced in the formal sector rises.
According to Bose et al. (2012) in developed economies 
characterized by high level of financial development, individual 
or firm have easy access to the credit market. However, borrowers 
have to declare their income and/or assets and this can be used 
as collateral or to gauge their creditworthiness but in doing so 
they will subject to tax liability. Since the value provided by the 
financial intermediation is considerable (Gordon and Li, 2009), 
there is less incentive to evade tax and the need to participate in 
the shadow economy is minimal. Blackburn et al. (2012) explain 
the connection between shadow market activity and credit market 
development using a simple model of tax evasion and financial 
intermediation. In imperfect financial markets (with asymmetric 
information) potential borrowers are required to declare their 
income or wealth in order to acquire a loan to finance their 
investment. The amount of wealth will determine the amount 
of collateral for securing a loan and also the type of terms and 
conditions of the loan contract made available to them. Thus, the 
less wealth been declared, less collateral to secure the required 
loan and the worse will be the terms and condition of the loan 
contract. Blackburn et al. (2012) point out that at low level of 
financial development, the credit arrangement is worsen. Thus, the 
benefit of wealth disclosure increases with the level of financial 
development with the implication that individual or firm participate 
in the shadow economy decline as the economy moves from a low 
to high level of financial development.
Capasso and Jappelli (2013) provide a theoretical framework in 
which agents allocate investment between a low-return technology 
which can be operated with internal funds, and a high-return 
technology which requires external finance. Firm can reduce the 
cost of funding by disclosing part or all of their assets and pledging 
them as collateral. The disclosure decision, however, also involves 
higher tax payments and reduces tax evasion. Their model predict 
that financial development (a reduction in the cost of credit) 
induces firm to disclose more assets and to invest in a high-tech 
project, and an improvement in the judicial efficiency reduces 
the cost of credit and the size of the shadow economy. On the 
other hand, using a standard overlapping generation framework, 
Bittencourt et al. (2014) posit that both a lower (higher) level of 
financial development and a higher (lower) level of inflation lead 
to a bigger (smaller) shadow economy. Furthermore, societies with 
a higher (lower) level of financial development will have a lower 
(higher) cost of monitoring. Borrowers that choose to undeclared 
their income to the bank will be subjected to higher costs of access 
to and conditions of obtaining loans. These higher costs and with 
lower level of financial development, will provides an incentive 
for borrowers to participate in tax evasion activities.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this study we specify the determinants of shadow economy for 
Malaysia as follows:
lshadow ltax lunemp lfindev lfindevt t t t t t= + + + + +θ θ θ θ θ ω0 1 2 3 4
2
 (1)
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Where, lshadowt is the size of shadow economy (calculated 
using MCDR approach below); ltaxt is ratio of tax revenue to 
GDP; lunempt is unemployment rate; lfindevt is financial sector 
development measured by ratio of domestic credit to private sector 
by banks to GDP; lfindevt
2 is financial sector development square 
to establish whether the relationship between shadow economy 
and financial sector development is non-linear. The error term is 
demoted by ωt. It is expected a priori that θ1, θ2 > 0. However, 
the expected sign for θ3 and θ4 is ambiguous. However, we 
conjecture that if the Malaysian data support the contention made 
by Blackburn et al. (2012), then there is a non-linear relationship 
between shadow economy and financial sector development with a 
priori expected sign, θ3 > 0 and θ4 < 0. This relationship implies that 
at lower stages of financial sector development shadow economy 
is increasing until at some point at higher level of financial sector 
development shadow economy starts to decrease, thus, exhibit an 
inverted U-shape curve.
In this study we compute the size of the shadow economy using the 
MCDR procedure proposed by Pickhardt and Sarda (2011; 2013). 
Using the Fisher’s (1911) quantity theory of money, Pickhardt and 
Sarda (2011; 2013) arrive at the following MCDR, which equals 
the ratio of shadow economy income to official income:












Where, CiCt denotes currency in circulation at the end of year t; 
CiC0 is currency in circulation at the end of base year, here 1971; 
DDt represents demand deposits at the end of year t; GDPLt 
and GDPUt denote the size of the legal and shadow economy 
respectively. Thus, GDPUt/GDPLt measures the share of shadow 
economy to the legal economy (official GDP).
Data on tax revenue, gross GDP, unemployment rate, and domestic 
credit to private sector by banks were collected from the World 
Development Indicators published online and accessible at 
the World Bank database (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
all). Data for currency in circulation and demand deposits were 
collected from various issues of the monthly Bulletin published by 
the Central Bank of Malaysia. The period of study is from 1971 
to 2013. All variables were transformed into natural logarithm 
and denoted by l.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Table 1, we present the results of the unit root tests as well as 
the cointegration tests for shadow economy in Malaysia. In Panel 
A, the unit root test results clearly indicate that all variables are 
I(1), that is the series achieved stationarity after first-differencing. 
These results clearly suggest that all variables are non-stationary 
in level. For estimating the long-run model as per Equation (1) and 
besides using ordinary least square (OLS), other procedures which 
are appropriate for small sample and can eliminate simultaneity or 
endogeneity bias include dynamic OLS (DOLS), fully modified 
OLS (FMOLS), and canonical cointegrating regression (CCR). 
Stock and Watson (1993) propose the dynamic OLS; Park (1992) 
introduces the canonical cointegrating regression; while Phillips 
and Hansen (1990) suggest the fully-modified OLS. However, 
the long-run model is valid or non-spurious if all variables in 
Equation (1) are cointegrated. To test for cointegration, for OLS 
we employ the conventional Engle and Granger (1987) two-step 
procedure for testing the null hypothesis of non-cointegration or 
the present of unit root on the residuals. On the other hand, for 
FMOLS, DOLS and CCR, we report the Lc-statistics, the test for 
the null hypothesis of cointegration.
Generally, cointegration is detected for all four estimators used in 
the analyses. For OLS, the null hypothesis of non-cointegration can 
be rejected at the 5% level. On the other hand, the cointegration test 
shown by the Lc-statistics under FMOLS, DOLS and CCR suggest 
that the null hypothesis of cointegration cannot be rejected. In all 
cases, the long-run models of the shadow economy suggest that 
tax burden, unemployment rate and financial sector development 
Table 1: Results of unit root tests and long-run models for 
shadow economy in Malaysia
Panel A: DF-GLS unit root test












































Panel B: Cointegration tests















































Asterisk **denotes statistically significant at 5% level. The DF-GLS unit root test used 
in the study is proposed by Elliot et al. (1996) and this test has significantly greater 
power than the previous versions of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. For this test 
the calculated statistics are those computed in MacKinnon (1996). The optimal lag 
length in curly brackets {.} was chosen based on SC criterion throughout the analysis. 
In this study, we used EViews8 and the software automatically selects the optimal lag 
length. For the long-run models, figures in round brackets (.) are t-statistics; figures in 
square brackets [.] are P values; figures in slash brackets/./is lead and lag for DOLS. 
For the cointegration tests; the E-G test denotes the DF t-statistic on the cointegrating 
regression’s residual. Lc-statistic measures Hansen (1992) parameter instability test for 
cointegration. The E-G tests with null hypothesis of no cointegration while the Hansen 
test the null hypothesis of cointegration. OLS: Ordinary least square, FMOLS: Fully 
modified ordinary least square, DOLS: Dynamic ordinary least square, CCR: Canonical 
cointegrating regression
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are important determinants of the Malaysian shadow economy. 
Our results suggest that increase in tax burden and unemployment 
rate increases the size of the shadow economy.
Our main interest emerge from this study is the non-linear 
relationship shown between shadow economy and financial sector 
development for Malaysia. As indicated by the sign of θ3 being 
positive while θ4 is negative, this suggests an inverted U-shape 
curve – a non-linear relationship between the shadow economy and 
financial sector development in Malaysia. The inverted U-shape 
curve suggests that as financial sector development progress in 
Malaysia from lower to higher level, shadow economy at first 
increases and then shadow economy decreases. Our findings 
support the contention by Bose et al. (2012), Blackburn et al. 
(2012) and Bittencourt et al. (2014) that access to finance is 
difficult at lower level of financial development and players seek 
alternative financing and participate in the shadow economy; 
but as financial sector development develops and becomes more 
sophisticated, access to finance will be much easier, cost of 
financing becomes cheaper, players willing to participate in the 
formal economy as the opportunity cost in participating in the 
shadow economy increases, thus, reducing the size of the shadow 
economy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In the present study, we estimate the size of the shadow economy 
in Malaysia for the period 1971-2013. Further, we relate shadow 
economy with its determinants - tax burden, unemployment 
rate and financial sector development. Our estimated long-run 
models suggest that tax burden and unemployment rate increases 
the size of the shadow economy in Malaysia. Interestingly, our 
study reveal that the relationship between shadow economy and 
financial sector development in Malaysia was found to exhibit an 
inverted U-shape curve: Shadow economy increases at lower level 
of financial development but as financial development increases, 
shadow economy ultimately decreases. Thus, our findings support 
the earlier work of Bose et al. (2012), Blackburn et al. (2012) and 
Bittencourt et al. (2014). An important policy conclusion is that 
the Malaysian government should embark on programs that can 
reduce the size of the shadow economy, and easy access to the 
credit market and further reform of the financial sector should be 
the focus.
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